











Can Nietzsche’s Noble be Moral and Just?

ABSTRACT
Nietzsche endorses a positive value system grounded in his concept of the will to power, a ‘noble’ alternative to the ‘slavish,’ life-denying values he believes characterize modern European morality.  This value system is usually interpreted as an alternative to morality and social justice, rather than as the basis of a competing morality or conception of justice.  Because Nietzsche founds his values in the affirmation of power, they appear to be incompatible with the responsibility to others that characterizes any authentic morality or theory of justice.  In this paper, I argue, on the contrary, that Nietzsche’s values are not only fully compatible with morality, but also (whether intentionally or not) conducive to an egalitarian conception of social justice.  I defend this view by rejecting two common misconceptions: 1) the view that the will to power is inseparable from domination and 2) the view that the noble mode of evaluation presupposes and promotes social hierarchy.  I argue that Nietzsche’s values do not promote power in a sense that necessitates moral harm or social inequality, and that his analysis of slave morality entails that its overcoming is possible only through the achievement of social equality.





	In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche distinguishes between two fundamental types of value systems that he calls ‘noble morality’ and ‘slave morality.’  The Genealogy is a work largely concerned with tracing the historical origins of one specific instance of the slavish type: namely, modern European morality, which Nietzsche believes originates with the birth of Christianity as a form of spiritual revenge against the political oppression of the Roman Empire.  European morality, on Nietzsche’s view, is an indirect spiritual insurrection, made necessary by the practical impossibility of true political retaliation.  It is a revolt that takes the form of a new morality created through the inversion of the oppressor’s value system, one that identifies the noble class, and its values, as ‘evil’ rather than ‘good.’  
	While this account purports to be an historical inquiry, it is also a critique.  Nietzsche views modern European morality (and the slavish form of values in general) as essentially life-denying and detrimental to human flourishing.  However, the Genealogy is not only a critical work.  It also the beginning of a less explicit, and often ignored or dismissed, positive project in Nietzsche’s work: to articulate alternative values to replace those that dominate the modern western world, values that embody the life-affirming character he attributes to the noble form of values.  This is, it should be stressed, a demand for a return to a form of value-system—and not a return to the specific values of any particular historical people.
	Of course, Nietzsche is a self-proclaimed ‘immoralist.’  So the alternative to European morality he presents, a noble value system grounded in the primary values of power and the will to power, is not a morality in the conventional sense.  Yet he does clearly endorse a new set of values.  And while he has no intention of producing a new morality, he need not, and never explicitly claims to, reject morality as such.  His critique of morality is, first of all, a critique of one particular historical morality and the form of value-system it represents.​[1]​  It is a critique that depends not on that value-system’s status as moral, but upon its negative consequences for human flourishing which, for Nietzsche, is equivalent to the flourishing of humanity’s highest individuals.
	In this paper I will argue that Nietzsche’s alternative set of values in the noble mode—though grounded in the valorization of power and not intended as a moral system—are nonetheless compatible with morality and conducive to an egalitarian conception of social justice.  That is to say, Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed noble values can ground a morality that is also conducive to the promotion of social equality—a surprising suggestion, to be sure.  And I should stress that I do not claim Nietzsche does or would endorse such a morality or such a notion of justice, only that he may consistently do so.  My intention is first and foremost to defeat the common assumption that Nietzsche’s philosophy is inherently anti-moral and anti-egalitarian, and that, consequently, his principal interest to moral and political thought is as nothing more than a provocative critic against which our ethical intuitions and ideals are to be tested.  There are, beneath the cruel rhetoric and often blind prejudice of Nietzsche’s moral and political declarations, positive possibilities that have been overlooked not only by his interpreters, but also by Nietzsche himself. 
	I will begin with a brief explanation of Nietzsche’s distinction of noble and slavish values, followed by a discussion of Nietzsche’s suggestion of alternative values in the noble mode, values founded in the affirmation of power.  I will claim that Nietzsche’s noble, power-affirming values are compatible with morality and discuss two key objections to this claim: 1) the objection that because power is inseparable from domination, values grounded in the affirmation of power are incompatible with moral concern for others, and 2) the objection that noble values are inseparable from social hierarchy.  I will then propose that Nietzsche’s noble values are both compatible with and conducive to egalitarian forms of justice.  I will first respond to the possible objection that egalitarian values are an expression of slave values.  Finally, I will show that Nietzsche’s conception of justice provides a noble motivation to promote equality, because it is only through the achievement of social equality that slavish values can be overcome.

2. Noble and Slavish Values and Nietzsche’s Value of Power
	Throughout his later writings, Nietzsche attempts to articulate a positive, evaluative concept of nobility, one that is independent of political connotation, and designating a psychological type rather than a social or political position.  While he fails to clearly define what counts as nobility of character—he usually relies on overly general, ambiguous references to spiritual strength, free-spiritedness, responsibility and the like—he does quite clearly identify the origin and form of noble values.  
	The designation of these values as ‘noble’ is not accidental since, for Nietzsche, both the noble as a psychological type, and the noble form of values, originate historically in a politically privileged people or class.  A noble people’s values, he tells us, directly reflect the success and privilege of that group by having self-affirmation as the foundation of their concept of goodness.  These values simply celebrate the achieved well-being of a people, identifying, preserving, and enhancing an already-attained level of well-being.  Noble values are, then, primarily affirmative in character.  The noble concept of the good is a direct affirmation of a positively-evaluated condition, producing what Nietzsche calls a morality of ‘self-glorification’ (BGE 260).​[2]​  Such a morality begins with the nobles’ positive evaluation of their own power, success, and happiness, and secondarily derives its concept of the ‘bad’ relative to that primary self-affirming value.  Of the noble mode of evaluation he says:  ‘It acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly—its negative concept ‘low,’ ‘common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently-invented, pale, contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept’ (GM I: 10).  This noble form of values and of value creation is, in turn, directly opposed to the form that values take among an oppressed class or people, the form of value system that Nietzsche labels ‘slave morality.’  In slave morality, goodness is defined as the negation, reduction, or elimination of the bad or ‘evil’: 

	While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave 	morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not 	itself’; and this No is its creative deed . . . in order to exist, slave morality always first 	needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in 	order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction.  (GM I: 10)

So, in Nietzsche’s attempt to trace the origins of modern European morality, he has also identified two basic and opposed forms that value-systems may take: noble or slavish.  These are not specific moralities, but basic categories into which Nietzsche believes every value-system must fall.  Noble values have their foundation in the identification and promotion of positive conditions of happiness, from which the concept of the bad is then derived secondarily as the privation of the good.  Slavish values, in contrast, are founded in the identification of unhappiness and conditions of unhappiness, from which the concept of the good is then secondarily derived as the negation of evil.  Nietzsche speaks loosely of these categories as ‘noble morality’ and ‘slave morality’—however, it should be noted that the basic distinction is one of values generally, rather than specifically moral values.   
This distinction of noble and slavish values is the foundation not only of Nietzsche’s critique of modern European morality, but also of his positive project of producing an alternative to those values.  Although he does not explicitly present his alternative as a fully formed value-system, all of his work after the Genealogy assumes a conception of the human good grounded in the Genealogy’s critique of the harmful effects of slave morality upon human flourishing.  Throughout his later writings he makes consistent use of an evaluative language of good and bad, healthy/strong and decadent/weak, noble and slavish,​[3]​ distinctions that reveal Nietzsche’s commitment to a set of primary values corresponding in form to those of the noble type.  Like the historical value-systems he associates with political nobility, Nietzsche’s positive values begin with the identification of the condition of human happiness as the good, and the secondary derivation of the concept of the bad as the privation of that condition.  For Nietzsche, that condition and primary value is the value of power.
This identification of Nietzsche’s values is most explicit in one of his final major works, The Anti-Christ.  There he presents a general claim about the human good grounded in his concept of power (die Macht).  It is power that grounds human well-being, and it is the promotion of power that constitutes human flourishing: ‘What is good? [gut] – All that heightens the feeling of power [das Gefühl der Macht], the will to power [den Willen zur Macht], power itself in man. What is happiness? – The feeling that power increases – that a resistance is overcome’ (A 2).  The ‘bad’ (schlecht), on the other hand, is simply the lack of the good as he has defined it; it is ‘all that proceeds from weakness.’  Consequently, the bad exists only relative to an independently determined, primary conception of the good.  Without the comparison to states of power and the feeling of power, there would be no basis for the judgment of ‘bad.’  
	So the Nietzschean concept of the good is, generally, the affirmation of power as intrinsically valuable and the promotion of the increase of the feeling of power.  I will now argue that this basic value identification of goodness with power is, in principle, compatible with morality.  Admittedly, Nietzsche’s conception of the good is not a moral one.  It is, first of all, not clearly normative.  Nietzsche relies upon these values for the evaluation of persons and actions, but does not claim that human beings have a moral duty to promote the good or resist the bad.​[4]​  Second, Nietzsche’s values appear to concern only the well-being of the subject or, at most, a select group of exceptional individuals.  Consequently, this concept of the good does not, as I will assume any true morality must do, take into consideration the well-being of the social group as a whole.​[5]​  Finally, Nietzsche’s noble values do include any notion of moral responsibility—of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for an action or character trait. ​[6]​
Nevertheless, it may be possible to modify Nietzsche’s conception of the good to meet any or all of these characteristics of morality.  A Nietzschean morality meeting these requirements would: 1) treat the promotion of power and the feeling of power as a moral duty, 2) demand the promotion of every individual’s power, not just one’s own, and 3) hold individuals morally responsible for acting in accordance with that duty.  Is such a morality possible?  
I believe there are two principal obstacles to such an attempt to conceive of a Nietzschean noble morality.  First, Nietzsche’s identification of power as the basis of human well-being, and his identification of the ‘will to power’ as the principal motivation of human behavior,​[7]​ suggests that the human individual is self-interested in a way that is essentially at odds with moral concern for others.  A self-affirmative morality that defines goodness in terms of power will, then, be internally inconsistent; for it will require the promotion of incompatible goods.  Second, because Nietzsche associates the noble form of values with the oppression of a slave class by a noble class, it appears that value systems of the noble form have social hierarchy as a precondition—a precondition that is morally unacceptable.  I will argue that both of these objections are based in a misinterpretation of Nietzsche’s views.  The sense of power at issue in Nietzsche’s definition of the good does not entail an incompatibility of individual goods, and the historical relation of social hierarchy to noble values is contingent: noble values do not promote inequality.

3. The Compatibility of Morality and the Affirmation of Power
A morality grounded in Nietzsche’s values must include a duty to promote the good of every member of the social group.  However, it might be objected that such a duty would be incompatible with the primary basis of noble values in self-affirmation.  In other words, the ‘selfishness’ that grounds noble values seems to be incompatible with the concern for the well-being of others that characterizes morality.  If so, then a Nietzschean concept of the moral good is internally inconsistent: one cannot simultaneously promote the increase of one’s own power and feeling of power as well as that of every member of the social group.  
This objection rests on the assumption that the promotion of one’s own good is incompatible with the altruistic promotion of another’s good, a plausible one in Nietzsche’s case, given his association of the good with power.​[8]​  However, it is based in a misunderstanding.  Nietzsche uses the word power (die Macht) first and foremost in the sense of the power to act: to realize or produce.  In his references to the ‘will to power’ he emphasizes its positive and active form.  The will to power is described, for example, as ‘spontaneous,’ ‘form-giving’ (GM II.12), ‘life-affirming’ (GM III:18), and ‘creative’ (BGE 211).  In every case the emphasis is upon power’s positive etymological origin in the verb ‘to make’ or ‘to do’ (machen): power is identified and measured as the production of effects, not measured negatively as the limitation or control of other powers.  
Admittedly, the fact that the will to power is fundamentally determined as positive activity does not mean that it does not have negative effects.  Every effective action is the negation of the conditions it changes, shapes, or transforms, which is why Nietzsche famously claims that ‘life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character’ (GM II: 12).  ‘Life is,’ he claims, ‘essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering’ (BGE 259).  Surely, we might be tempted to conclude, this settles the matter: life is fundamentally at odds with morality; human nature must be so as well.  
However, this apparently obvious inference—one which Nietzsche sometimes draws—is simply false.  What follows from the claim that exploitation (to choose only one description from Nietzsche’s provocative list) is an essential feature of life is simply that ‘exploitation’ in some sense is a necessary feature of every action.  However, this does not in turn entail an incompatibility between human nature and morality.  First, it does not mean that humans have a fundamental drive, desire, or will to exploit persons or things.  Consequently we cannot conclude the moral restraint of exploitation is also a frustration of human desire, nature, or happiness.  It only tells us that every action will involve exploitation, regardless of what drives or desires motivate the action.  Second, it does not follow that the exploitation that essentially characterizes every human action is ‘exploitation’ in an ethically problematic sense.  Not only does this not follow; it is clearly false.  For if exploitation is an essential feature of life, then the sense of ‘exploitation’ (or ‘injury,’ ‘assault,’ ‘destruction,’ etc.) that Nietzsche is using must be broad enough to describe every human action.  Unless we are willing to admit the absurd view that every human activity is essentially immoral, then surely this is not ‘exploitation’ in a morally relevant sense.  Because Nietzsche is attempting to characterize life as such, these descriptions are so general as to be almost empty of content when applied to the question of social and ethical injury, violence, or domination among persons.
Consequently, a will or tendency to heighten one’s power is not necessarily a desire to increase power relative to another’s power.  Nor is it a desire to decrease another’s power: ‘the state in which we hurt others . . . is a sign that we are still lacking power’ (GS 13).​[9]​  Rather, to increase power is fundamentally to increase one’s power in relation to one’s own activity: to enhance and exercise one’s abilities, to increase one’s ability to act, to do, or to produce, not unlike the contemporary usage of the term ‘empowerment.’  ‘Every animal,’ Nietzsche says, ‘instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength’ (GM III: 7).  The will to power is not, then, measured by the effect of one’s power upon others, but according to one’s ability to act, to manifest or expend strength.  Individual human power is primarily the cultivation of capability, independence of action, and self-mastery; it is not primarily or necessarily a matter of having more power than, or power over, someone else (of overpowering, dominating, or exploiting).​[10]​  
Moreover, when Nietzsche connects goodness to power, his stress is not on the increase of power simply but rather upon the increase of the feeling of and will to power (‘All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power. . . . The feeling that power increases’).  Both of these conditions—the feeling of power and the will to power—can be increased independently of any increase in one’s power measured in relation to another’s.  That is, one can feel powerful, and one can will or strive to be powerful, without possessing greater power than another.  There is no necessary inverse relationship between the level of one’s own feeling of power and the power of another.  This emphasis upon feeling of power rather than power is, then, a further indication that for Nietzsche power is primarily positive and productive—the measure of power is the positive criterion of the ability to act, not the negative criterion of the effect of one’s actions upon another.​[11]​  Consequently, it is possible to enhance one subject’s power or feeling of power without decreasing another’s.​[12]​  And if the increase of each subject’s good is in principle compatible with the increase of every other subject’s good, then it is possible for a Nietzschean morality of power to consistently affirm and promote the good of every member of the social group.  A noble form of morality is possible, because the promotion of the other’s good is not the negation of one’s own.  The basis of noble morality—the primacy of self-affirmation in the conception of the good—remains intact even when Nietzsche’s power-centered conception of the good is expanded to include the good of others.

4. The Independence of Noble Values from Social Hierarchy
The conclusion that a noble morality based in the value of power is possible might seem surprising, and Nietzsche would surely not endorse such a morality.  Nonetheless, such a morality is thoroughly compatible with Nietzsche’s own account of the origin of noble values.  This may not, at first, appear to be the case.  Most interpreters assume, based on Nietzsche’s description of the origin of noble values in an aristocratic social caste, that social hierarchy and domination are a precondition for noble values.  Consequently, noble values require social inequality either for their production or their support—a requirement incompatible with morality.  This objection is based on a mistaken equation of the noble as a psychological type with the ‘master,’ that is, with a social position of power over others.  Though Nietzsche historically connects the development of noble values to a position of political privilege, I will argue that social hierarchy and political domination are not necessary to noble values.  Moreover, any set of values that requires social domination will conform to Nietzsche’s description of ‘slave’ values rather than that of ‘noble’ values.  
Nietzsche’s discussion of the historical origins of noble values in On the Genealogy of Morality appears to suggest that the creation of noble values is a direct product of the condition of belonging to a privileged and more powerful social group.  This leads some commentators to suggest that noble values (and, consequently, a noble morality grounded in Nietzsche’s values) are impossible without the division of the community into higher and lower, more and less powerful, dominating and dominated.​[13]​  But although Nietzsche does historically associate noble values with a master class that dominates a weaker class, we cannot directly conclude that social domination is a precondition of noble values.  Even if social mastery can be the basis of noble evaluation, it need not be the only possible basis.  More importantly, social mastery may not directly be the basis of noble evaluation at all.   
Although it is a ‘master’ class that founds values of the noble type, Nietzsche does not give any indication that this is only because it occupies the social position of master.  He does, in contrast, make it quite clear that the slave class produces slavish values simply because of its social condition of oppression.  In other words, social domination is indeed a direct basis for the production of slavish values.  The essentially negative nature of slave morality directly reflects the misery of the slave’s actual condition: ‘Suppose the violated, oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of themselves and weary, moralize: what will their moral valuations have in common?  Probably, a pessimistic suspicion about the whole condition of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man along with his condition’ (BGE 260).  The slavish concept of the good, as we have seen, originates as a direct negation of the hated other who causes the slave’s misery.  It is because the slave is dominated, or ‘denied the true reaction, that of deeds’ (GM I: 10), that the slave makes its oppressor the negative measure of moral value.  Slave values are characterized by a ‘longing for freedom, the instinct for happiness and the subtleties of the feeling of freedom’ (BGE 260) precisely because they have their basis in the absence of freedom and happiness.  Consequently, we would be quite justified in assuming that slave values require for their existence the condition of social hierarchy, domination, or oppression.  But this is not the case with noble values.  
The primary conditions that give rise to the noble form of values are simply those of well-being and happiness—in Nietzsche’s language, power and the feeling of power.  Nietzsche says that the noble ‘honors himself as one who is powerful’ and as one ‘who has power over himself’ (BGE 260).  The ‘basic concept’ of noble evaluation, he tells us, is the assertion, ‘We noble ones, we good, beautiful, happy ones!’ (GM I: 10)  But if the only precondition of noble self-affirmation (and thus of noble values) is happiness, then we cannot directly conclude that social mastery is also a precondition and that, consequently, social domination is necessary for the possibility of a noble morality.  For the ground of happiness for Nietzsche is the feeling of power and, as I have argued above, there is no necessary connection between power, the feeling of power, and social domination.  Noble values presuppose happiness—they require an achieved state of power, ability, and well-being for their support.  But they do not presuppose a happiness that must come at the expense of other individuals or entire social groups.  Consequently, the power that grounds noble morality need not be political power.  Social masters may, thanks to the power that social domination brings, be noble in character and in the form of their values.  However, nobles need not be social masters.  Noble values are independent of political status and the specific conditions of social hierarchy.
We cannot, then, directly conclude from Nietzsche’s description of noble values that all values of this form require social hierarchy as their basis.  More importantly, there is a very strong reason for completely rejecting that conclusion: namely, any set of values that requires the existence of an oppressed or negatively-evaluated other will correspond to Nietzsche’s description of slave values rather than noble values.  That is, any morality that requires or promotes social hierarchy is a slavish one.  
To establish this, let us hypothetically consider the case of a noble value-system that requires or promotes social inequality.  We shall see that such a case is, in fact, impossible.  For if these values presuppose the condition of social mastery over other persons, then that condition must be included in the definition of the good in that value system.  The concept of the good in this hypothetical hierarchical noble morality would still be defined as power and the increased feeling of power, but with the added stipulation that power is to be measured negatively against another’s power.  This concept of the good would not consist simply of the affirmation of the noble’s own happiness, but would instead include the devaluation of the slave’s happiness.  In other words, the noble’s superiority would be determined relative to the slave’s inferiority.  The good would be determined not as power, happiness, or pleasure simply, but would instead depend upon comparison.  
This is completely at odds with Nietzsche’s account of noble values—indeed, so much so, that such an interpretation mirrors his description of slave morality.  Nietzsche tells us that the noble simply ‘feel’ themselves to be happy; they do not have to ‘establish their happiness artificially by examining their enemies’ (GM I: 10).  ‘The free man,’ according to Nietzsche, ‘possess his measure of value: looking upon others from himself, he honors or despises’ (GM II: 2).  However, in any value system where the good requires the political subordination of another, the concept of the good is no longer primarily affirmative, as Nietzsche has claimed is the case with noble values.  Like the slavish concept of the good, a hierarchical morality of power begins with a primary ‘No,’ a ‘need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself’ (GM I: 10).  Nietzsche describes this strategy of value creation, one which affirms the self only in its difference from a devalued other, as ‘the essence of resentment,’ where resentment is the primary characteristic of the slave as a psychological type.  The good in this version of noble morality is little more than the negation of the other’s equality and independence, or the negation of one’s own weakness as measured against the other’s strength.  Whereas the noble type ‘experiences itself as determining values’ and sees itself as ‘that which first accords honor to things’ (BGE 360), this conception of the good is one in which the subject needs the other in order to determine its own value; its value is grounded in comparison.  Admittedly, noble values also include comparison, but in precisely the opposite way: the noble determines its concept of the bad through comparison to itself as the good.  In the case of values that include the position of social privilege in their conception of the good, on the contrary, the bad is not derived secondarily.  Rather, the good presupposes the identification of the bad with the other’s equality, independence, or power.  This hypothetical version of noble morality turns out to be a thoroughly slavish interpretation of nobility in which the individual affirms her own power only through the negation of another’s power.  It is no coincidence that this slavish interpretation of nobility leads to a purely negative concept of power, the very same understanding of power that is assumed in conventional readings of the will to power as a desire to overpower or dominate.  
Ultimately, we cannot view social hierarchy as a precondition for noble values without seriously confusing, and ultimately inverting, Nietzsche’s primary opposition of noble and slavish values.  Consequently, Nietzsche’s category of noble values does not require or presuppose a state of social hierarchy, and there is no incompatibility between noble values and morality.  As much as Nietzsche may have wanted to be an anti-moralist, to reject morality in its entirety, nothing about his conceptions of power, human nature, or nobility, requires that he take such a position.  

4. The Possibility of a Noble Form of Egalitarian Justice
It is a surprising enough conclusion that, for all his critical fury against morality, Nietzsche has failed to completely dispose of it, even on his own terms.  This compatibility between Nietzsche’s values and morality has even more striking consequences for the issue of social justice.  If a Nietzschean morality of power is possible, there are no obvious obstacles to a noble form of social justice grounded in such a morality.  For the principal obstacles to such a form of justice are identical to those I have already addressed in relation to morality.  However, I would like to go further than simply suggesting the compatibility of Nietzsche’s noble values and justice.  I will now argue that Nietzsche’s values are compatible with specifically egalitarian conceptions of justice and that, indeed, these values are even conducive to egalitarian conceptions of justice. 
It might seem obvious that Nietzsche’s values cannot possibly be compatible with egalitarianism in any form.  His disdain for the concept of ‘equality’ is well-known, and his work is full of criticisms of egalitarian ideals and political movements.​[14]​  Again, however, my question is whether Nietzsche could consistently endorse such a conception while maintaining his commitment to the affirmation of power and to the noble mode of evaluation—it is not a question of whether or not he would endorse it.  Are Nietzsche’s radical immoralism and vehement anti-egalitarianism a logical consequence of his key philosophical commitments, or are they merely an expression of personal prejudices that have no necessary connection to the principle features of his moral philosophy?
For the present purposes, I will define ‘justice’ broadly as the use of legal and political institutions to protect the achieved good of every member of a social group.  A conception of justice may also include the active promotion of the social good in addition to its protection.  For example, an egalitarian conception of justice, in addition to preserving the achieved good of its members, actively seeks to produce equality among its members.  That is, it actively promotes the good of its members, where the individual good is believed to include some form and degree of political or economic equality.  
The most immediate objection to my proposal of a Nietzschean form of egalitarian justice will likely be the claim that egalitarianism is an expression of slave morality.  Nietzsche seems to suggest as much in his own criticisms of the concept of equality.  According to this objection, the demand for equality is an expression of slavish resentment, because one’s own good is defined as the negation of another’s power—in this case, the negation of the other’s political or economic superiority.  Surely, this is incompatible with the primarily affirmative foundation of noble values.  Moreover, since egalitarianism seeks to reduce the power of the ruling classes, it is clearly at odds with Nietzsche’s affirmation of power and the feeling of power.
This objection is a variation upon the earlier discussed objection to Nietzschean morality.  Like that objection, it depends on the assumption that power is equivalent to or inseparable from domination—a sense of power that I believe Nietzsche cannot consistently endorse.  The demand for equality is an expression of slavish values only if it is a demand to eliminate or reduce another’s power.  But the demand for equal power is not necessarily such a demand (no more, for example, than a demand for equal pay is a demand that others’ salaries be reduced to the level of one’s own).  It is so only if the increase of my power comes at expense of another’s.  That is to say, egalitarianism is slavish only if we assume that the individual’s good, as defined by Nietzsche, is essentially incompatible with the good of others.  For only then would social equality require the reduction of another’s power.  I have already argued that this is not the case.  Nietzsche understands the human good in terms of power and the feeling of power, which can be increased independently of the power of others; it is measured primarily in relation to the subject’s ability to act rather than in relation to the effects of the subject’s power upon others. 
Consequently, the demand for equality can be entirely affirmative—a demand for the maximization of every individual’s good, since the good of every subject can in principle be brought up to the same level.  There are, we might say, slavish and noble conceptions of egalitarianism.  The slavish form assumes the incompatibility of human goods and demands equality as mutual sacrifice, while a noble form of egalitarianism is characterized by the assumption of compatible goods and promotes the equal maximization of power.  These two conceptions of egalitarianism mirror Nietzsche’s own distinction between two kinds of equality: ‘the thirst for equality can express itself either as a desire to draw everyone down to oneself (through diminishing them, spying on them, ripping them up) or to raise oneself and everyone else up (through recognizing their virtues, helping them, rejoicing in their success)’ (HA 300).  Equality is not necessarily the negation of the happiness or flourishing of those with greater power; it can instead be the promotion of the power and happiness of the unequal.  Consequently, a noble form of justice can include the promotion of social equality in its conception of the good. 

5. Equality as the Precondition of Lasting Noble Value Systems
	I would now like to take the argument a final step further: I will argue that Nietzsche’s values are not merely compatible with, but also conducive to, egalitarian justice.  Specifically, because of their noble form Nietzsche’s values provide individuals with a motivation to pursue social equality.  It is not simply that one might do so without doing harm to one’s own good, but that it is in the subject’s best interest to promote social equality.  
	To clarify this point, I will turn to Nietzsche’s account of the origins of justice and law.  As it happens, Nietzsche has already implied that there is a non-slavish motive for promoting justice, though not egalitarian justice.  There must be such a motive, for Nietzsche believes that it is the noble classes that originally founded justice.  He adamantly rejects the common view that justice is primarily motivated by envy, resentment, or revenge, as we might expect if justice were the invention of the oppressed or politically disadvantaged.  Justice is not grounded in these ‘reactive’ feelings, as he calls them.  On the contrary: ‘the ​last sphere to be conquered by the spirit of justice is the sphere of the reactive feelings.’  According to Nietzsche, justice and law are the invention of the noble class—precisely those who, given their fortunate position of social privilege, have little cause for resentment, envy or the desire for revenge.  Justice originates in the nobles’ attempt to bring slavish resentment to an end:

	From a historical point of view, law represents on earth . . . the struggle against the 	reactive feelings, the war conducted against them on the part of the active and aggressive 	powers who employed some of their strength to impose measure and bounds upon the 	excesses of the reactive pathos and compel it to come to terms.  Wherever justice is 	practiced and maintained one sees a stronger power seeking a means of putting an end to 	the senseless raging of ressentiment among the weaker powers that stand under it.  (GM 	II: 11)

This struggle against resentment includes the introduction of laws designed to protect their subjects and the introduction of legal forms of compensation for damages—that is, it includes measures designed to prevent and alleviate the conditions of inequality and suffering that produce reactive feelings.  The institution of law prevents such conditions by protecting subjects from one another, while the establishment of legal equivalents through which to compensate subjects for injury helps bring resentful feelings to an end by eliminating the need for retribution (GM II: 11).
	So what specifically motivates this historical noble caste to initiate a war on resentment in the forms of law and justice?  The motive follows from the primary opposition of noble and slavish values.  The nobles’ values are an affirmation of their own power and happiness.  But the slave’s values are a direct reversal of noble values, a direct negation of the noble type and the conditions of its happiness.  Because slave morality is nothing more than the inversion and negation of the nobles’ values, the self-affirming nature of noble values requires the active suppression of slave morality.  That is, the nobles cannot consistently affirm themselves and remain indifferent to a morality that has as its essence the negation of noble values and power.  Consequently, the attempt to eliminate reactive feelings through the institution of justice is motivated by the nobles’ desire to preserve and affirm their own values and conditions of happiness.  It is, in other words, motivated by a desire for self-preservation.
	This, in turn, suggests a possible motive for a Nietzschean form of egalitarian justice.  Like the alleviation of resentment, the promotion of equality is a necessary condition for the preservation of noble values.  Nietzsche’s Genealogy—though often read as a love letter to aristocratic politics—might instead be read as a cautionary tale about how social inequality leads inevitably to the cultural victory of slave morality.  It is, after all, social inequality that produces slave resentment, which in turn gives birth to slave morality.  If it is inequality is the principal basis of slave values, then what better defense against slave morality than equality? 
	As Nietzsche describes the original noble form of justice, it alleviates only specific injuries suffered by subjects, and only acknowledges injustices within a specific social class:  ‘Justice on this elementary level is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an ‘understanding’ by means of a settlement—and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves’ (GM II: 8).  So the original form of justice as practiced by the nobles upholds the social hierarchy in which it was founded.
	Because this original form of justice deals only with specific injuries inflicted by and upon members of a shared social class, it is ineffective at treating the injury that is the very foundation of all reactive social feelings and, ultimately, of slave morality: social hierarchy, inequality, and domination.  Justice cannot possibly succeed in its struggle against resentment and the rise of slave morality if it preserves class inequality.​[15]​  Yet the noble values that ground the project of justice cannot consistently allow for the existence of a morality that has as its essence the negation and overcoming of noble values and power.  Consequently, the consistent affirmation and preservation of noble values demands the elimination of social hierarchy as the very condition of its success.  The survival of ‘master morality’ is possible only through the sacrifice of the social-political position of ‘master.’
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^1	  For excellent discussions of the extent of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, see Leiter 2002: 74-77, Foot 1994, Clark 1994, and Bergmann 1988.   
^2	  All references to Nietzsche’s work use the standard abbreviations for the English titles: A - The Antichrist, BGE - Beyond Good and Evil, D – Daybreak, EH – Ecce Homo, GM – On the Genealogy of Morality, GS - The Gay Science, HH – Human All Too Human, TI – Twilight of the Idols, and Z – Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
^3	  On good and bad, see GM I: 17; on nobility, strength, and weakness, see BGE 200, 212, and Chapter 9, ‘What is Noble?’; on health, sickness, and decadence, see TI 2: 1-12; 5: 2, 4-5; 6: 2; 7: 2; 9: 35; A 15-20; and GM II: 24, III: 13-17, and 21.
^4	  On the non-moral status of noble ‘morality,’ see Clark 1994: 16.  Admittedly, Nietzsche might have to reject any normative theory of value on a number of grounds other than its compatibility with his power-affirming value system.  As Geuss has pointed out (2003: 39-40), Nietzsche rejects the ethical conception of obligation on a number of distinct grounds, including his rejection of any strong conception of agency or free will.  However, my present purpose is only to establish the compatibility of Nietzsche’s values with morality.  I do not claim that any morality is consistent with Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole, nor with his specific rejection of the traditional conception of moral agency.  Nevertheless, Geuss’ view overlooks the fact that Nietzsche may support the possibility of a broader form of moral normativity on the level of human rather than the individual development: ‘The problem I raise here is . . . what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future’ (A 3).  When he speaks of ‘species-enhancing’ judgments, or when he contrasts ‘taming’ and ‘breeding’ (die Züchtung, also ‘cultivation,’ ‘discipline,’ or ‘selection’) as forms of morality (BGE 4; TI 8; and A 3, 57), Nietzsche seems to accept the possibility that human values are conditions for the cultivation of differing human types, whether desirable (‘species-enhancing’) or dangerous (as in the case of the Christian ‘taming’ critiqued in The Anti-Christ).   Whether or not Nietzsche has any particular agenda for the normative production of any particular form of humanity, he at least seems to clearly accept that our values determine what kinds of human beings will thrive or not, and so express an effective norm about what we would like humanity to be.
^5	  That this is Nietzsche’s later view is uncontroversial.  However, as Richardson points out (1996: 149-50), Nietzsche does briefly entertain a very different view.  In Daybreak, he considers the possibility that the highest good might require sacrificing personal power in order to ‘strengthen and raise higher the general feeling of human power’ as a ‘positive enhancement of happiness’ (D 146).  
^6	  Although Nietzsche very explicitly rejects the third characteristic of moral responsibility out of commitment to a form of determinism (TI 6: 6-7), this leaves him the possible option of a consistent moral compatibilism.  Nevertheless, I will leave this issue out of consideration in what follows, as I do not assume the assignment of individual moral responsibility to be a necessary feature of an authentic morality.  
^7	  The view that the will to power has a primary place in Nietzsche’s psychological theory is a traditional one, though it has been occasionally questioned in recent literature (Clark 1990 and Leiter 2002).  Clark (1990: 224) appeals to Nietzsche’s reference to the ancients’ ‘strongest instinct, the will to power’ (TI X: 3) to argue that the will to power is merely one drive among many, rather than the general form of every particular drive or a more primary drive.  Leiter (2002: 142) draws a similar conclusion from Nietzsche’s reference to ‘terrible aspects of reality (in affects, in desires, in will to power)’ (EH IV: 4).  These two brief, passing comments are the only passages that suggest such a reading.  More importantly, they only indirectly suggest a view that Nietzsche very directly contradicts in numerous other passages that emphasize the primacy the will to power and even identify it with the will to life, life itself, and the ‘essence of life.’  See, from the list in Leiter’s own footnote: Z II: 12; GS: 349; BGE: 259; GM II:12.  See also A 6; TI 14; GM II: 11-12, III: 11; and BGE 9, 13, 23, 36, 186, and 230.  The scarcity and indirect quality of the evidence should alone be sufficient reason to treat arguments for this interpretation as inconclusive.  In any case, the passages in question do not clearly necessitate the interpretation.  The passage Leiter points to only tells us that will to power, affects, and drives all fall under the larger category of ‘terrible aspects of reality,’ which is not incompatible with the view that the affects and drives are secondary to or manifestations of the will to power.  I can, for example, meaningfully say that fear and suffering are both terrible aspects of life, even if fear is itself a specific instance of suffering.  Moreover, the context of the cited passage is a critique of the traditionally ‘good’ individual’s tendency to ignore ‘how reality is fundamentally constituted,’ thus suggesting that the ‘will to power’ is part of the fundamental constitution of reality.  As for the passage Clark appeals to, Nietzsche may simply be emphasizing that the manifestations of will to power that dominate Greek life and culture are particularly vivid and direct exemplars of that more basic drive—in the same way that one can speak of acting ‘naturally’ without, for all that, assuming the existence of any second, equally primary ‘nature.’  Indeed, the possibility of such a distinction between basic, primary tendency and specific manifestation, and of a possible tension between them, is the very possibility of the dilemma of asceticism that Nietzsche addresses in GM III, where Nietzsche points out that the ascetics’ paradoxical use of his own will to power against itself must be a merely apparent contradiction.   If the will to power can be expressed in the ascetic practice of stifling the will to power, then Nietzsche’s identification of the ancients’ strongest instinct as the will to power may mean little more than that their will to power manifested itself in specific forms more in keeping with the most basic and direct mode of the will to power’s expression.
^8	  See, for example, Danto 1965: 215; Hollingdale 1965: 158-63; and Kaufmann 1950: 185-6.  Each views the will to power as intrinsically a form of domination of or violence upon the outside world.  While this is the common view, the essential connection of will to power to domination has usually been taken for granted without explicit argument, since Nietzsche often speaks of the will to power in connection with violence and domination.  This is no accident: Nietzsche does indeed believe that these are common consequences of the will to power, but the question for our purposes is whether or not they are a necessary consequence of the will to power.  I argue below that they are not. 
^9	  That the increase of the subject’s ‘power’ in the sense of relevant to ‘will to power’ does not necessitate a decrease in another’s power should be evident from Nietzsche’s repeated suggestion that relationships of struggle or resistance are not obstacles to the will to power but rather its essence or precondition (GS 13, TI 5:3, 9:38; A 30, 57; BGE 44, 200, 212, 225, 260; EH 1: 7).  This is a point far too often overlooked in ethical and political assessments of Nietzsche’s psychology, but one which John Richardson has admirably explained.  See Richardson 1996: 162.
^10	  Clark entertains a somewhat similar view of the will to power (1990: 210-11), but ultimately rejects it.  My approach is sufficiently different to avoid the grounds of her objections.  Clark suggests that the will to power, on this view, must be a second-order desire to satisfy our first-order desires.  She concludes that on this interpretation, will to power cannot be a primary desire, since it presupposes first-order desires in order to be satisfied.  While my interpretation, like the one Clark considers, treats the will to power as a matter of ‘ability’ or ‘effectiveness,’ I do not suggest that it is a second-order desire.  The will to power is not a secondary desire to satisfy another more primary desire, but rather the very possibility that there are desires: if first-order desires are effective at all, they must already include the desire to act upon them: this may be the necessary condition of any desire at all.  Clark’s model of ‘orders’ of desire relies on a misleading treatment of the will to power as a ‘will’ in the psychological sense of a conscious or unconscious volition to achieve some aim—an interpretation that is incompatible with Nietzsche’s view since, as she herself points out (1990: 214-25), Nietzsche rejects the notion of the causality of the will as a mental faculty.  The will to power is not, on my interpretation, a volition or a mental act, but the very fact that desires lead to action, the very force or drive of human action.  It does not presuppose first order desires but is the condition for their efficacy.  
^11	  Golomb has made a similar point: ‘A man possessing a full sense of positive power does not need to exploit others to confirm and enhance his own self.  Hence, only such an individual can allow himself to regard others not as a means only, but also as ends in themselves’ (1989: 239).
^12	  Admittedly, Nietzsche’s psychology does suggest the necessity of agonistic relations of tension and struggle among subjects.  However, this crucial feature of Nietzsche’s understanding of human motivation and activity has usually been interpreted either in too voluntaristic a fashion (as though the will to power were a conscious desire to enter into conflict) or too moralistically (as though the will to power were a purely vindictive desire to decrease the power of another).  However, Nietzsche’s identification of conflict at the heart of every action must be read descriptively not moralistically: it does not require that these agonistic relations take specifically violent or destructive forms or have necessarily negative ethical consequences for either party in a relationship.  After all, the most striking aspect of Nietzsche’s power psychology is that he interprets every human interaction, even the most innocuous or apparently altruistic, as essentially agonistic—not just relations of overt conflict.  For an excellent explanation of the compatibility of altruistic activity and egoistic motivation in Nietzsche’s psychology, see Reginster 2000.  
^13	  See, for example, Strong 1975: 248: ‘Master morality always implies an oppressed class’ and Appel 1999.
^14	  See, for example, GS 377; Z II: 7; BGE 44, 62, 212, 238, and 265; and TI 48. 
^15	  Horkheimer has made a similar point: ‘The overcoming of this morality lies not in the positing of a better one, but in the creation of conditions under which its reason for existing is eliminated’ (1993: 109).
